Abstract: The theory of adaptive utility for sequential decision making offers a generalization of the classical Bayesian approach, permitting initial utility uncertainty. This paper examines how the possibility to learn preferences can be of interest for decisions in the area of reliability. The resulting differences in determining optimal strategies are explained and two examples are explored in which utility depends on the unknown cost of system failure. The paper concludes with a commentary on further research required.
INTRODUCTION
The Bayesian paradigm coupled with the expected utility hypothesis provides a compelling methodology for decision making under uncertainty. In the case of sequential decision making a decision maker (DM) may use observations of past results to update her beliefs over the future likelihood of outcomes, given selection of a particular decision. (In keeping with the tradition of the decision theory literature, DMs will be referred to as female.) However, it is traditionally assumed that the DM is able to state fully her utility function for any possible consequence realization, even those with which she has had little or no prior experience. As such, once the distribution over consequences are known for each possible decision, classical Bayesian theory does not permit a DM ever to learn or be surprised about the actual utility realized.
The theory of adaptive utility (AU) generalizes classical Bayesian decision theory, permitting the DM to remain uncertain over her preferences. Assuming a parametric form for the DM's utility function, it is envisaged that learning takes place in a similar manner to that which allows the DM to update beliefs over parameter values for consequence distributions, i.e. the DM may update her beliefs over unknown parameter values following data observation. These unknown utility parameters may take many forms, but interesting examples include vectors of trade-off weights or, of interest in reliability, the subjective cost of system failure. Learning may then occur following data such as noise-corrupted observations or surprise in actual utility realization. The important distinction from the classical theory, however, is that now the optimal initial decision need no longer correspond to that which would be selected if utilities were assumed equal to current expectations.
This work aims to consider how application of AU theory can be beneficial in some decision problems involving issues of reliability. To begin with, motivation for the use of AU theory is presented. After this, two specific decision problems, both of which assume that resulting utility is a function of the unknown subjective cost of system failure, are considered. Specifically, examples are considered of a system which has known failure modes, but where system failure leads to unknown costs. It is assumed that the DM is afforded opportunities to fix failure modes for a given cost and that she must decide whether or not it is beneficial to do so. The decision problem is thus to determine the optimal strategy of correcting system failures when loss through non-action is uncertain and where optimality is defined in the sense of maximizing expected utility. Such problems are known as statistical decision problems, where information received from past observations proves useful for determining the likelihood of future failures and costs. By treating the parameters of the loss function as random variables, AU theory permits the DM to remain uncertain over both system reliability and its associated expense.
In section 2 a brief review of classical Bayesian decision theory is presented. Section 3 discusses the motivation for and the theory behind AU decision making. Two examples are explored in section 4, and section 5 concludes with a commentary detailing challenges for developing the theory.
BAYESIAN DECISION THEORY
Sequential decision problems consist in taking decisions in sequence, with information typically being revealed between decision epochs and uncertainty usually existing over the result of at least one choice. Such problems are the subject of Bayesian statistical decision theory [1] [2] [3] , and, since the suggestions of Bernoulli [4] , are solved through maximization of expected utility. Axiomatic developments of Bernoulli's expected utility hypothesis were later given by authors such as von Neumann and Morgernstern [5] , Savage [6] , and de Finetti [7] , showing that the theory offers a decision selection technique that is not only transparent but also philosophically compelling.
Nevertheless, although the maximization of expected utility as a decision rule has an axiomatic foundation, it does not reasonably model the actions of real world DMs. Anomalies such as that discovered by Allais [8] and investigations such as that of Abdellaoui and Munier [9] show that real-world DMs act in a manner that is inconsistent with the maximization of expected utility. Alternative non-expected utility decision theories such as Kahneman and Tversky's [10] prospect theory and the Ben-Haim's [11] info-gap theory have been developed as descriptive theories seeking to predict the actions of DMs. Instead the maximization of expected utility, and the adaptive utility theory to be introduced in section 3, are to be seen as normative theories that do not seek to predict how a DM does act, but rather how they should act following some basic axioms of rational choice. Note that in the following a notational convention is adopted whereby subscripts denote decision epochs. All other information necessary in defining terms will be shown as a superscript.
Although there are many possibilities for formulating a sequential decision problem, each of which proving more useful than others in certain situations, for the purpose of this paper the following is considered. A sequence of n decisions d 1 , d 2 , . . ., d n is to be made (with d i 2 D) with the selection of decision d i occurring in decision epoch i. The result of a decision is assumed to depend on the true 'state of nature' v (with v 2 V). Let the space representing feasible sequences of n decisions be denoted by F n (with
A utility function is then defined to be a function u : F n · V ! R that is in agreement with the DM's subjective preferences, that is, if It is assumed that the problem is one of decision making under uncertainty, in which the DM may be uncertain over the state of nature v and with such uncertainty being represented by a prior subjective probability distribution P v . In such a situation, Bayesian decision theory stipulates that, in a problem where only a solitary decision is to be made, the DM should select that decision d 1 from the set of feasible decisions F 1 maximizing the expectation of u(
. Nevertheless, it may be that the distribution P v is only known up to the selection of a parameter f, that is, instead of P v being specified by the DM she instead specifies a distribution P v|f and another distribution P f giving prior subjective beliefs over the correct value of the parameter f (with f 2 F). If this is indeed the case, then the distribution P v can be returned to through the relation
. In sequential problems the DM may receive information between decision epochs that she deems relevant for updating beliefs over v and, if so, then this information should be taken into account when selecting future decisions. Moreover, if the DM is able to influence through her decision making the actual information that she is to receive, then she should consider not only the likely return of feasible decisions, but also their level of informativeness. For the purpose of this paper it is assumed that the only information that the DM receives concerning v are the results r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m 2 R observed when decisions d 1 , d 2 , . . ., d m respectively were made. Assuming that these observations are conditionally independent given v (i.e. that, given knowledge of v, the DM may not infer anything additional about the likelihood of results of future decisions if she knew results of previous decisions), the It should be clear that the optimal decision at a future epoch i will thus depend on the history H iÀ1 that will have been observed by the time of epoch i. Let p i represent a decision strategy in period i having observed decision history H iÀ1 , i.e. p i is a function which takes as its argument H iÀ1 and returns a feasible decision for epoch i. The feasible decisions for epoch i, having made prior decisions as stipulated by H iÀ1 , can be determined through knowledge of F n , and here such a set will be denoted as F n ðH iÀ1 Þ. Also, the optimal decision strategy for period i will be denoted as p* i .
Such optimal decision strategies can be found through the use of backward induction. Letting
. . , p* n ðH nÀ1 Þ,vÞ, it can be shown that, given predetermined optimal decision strategies p* iþ1 , p* iþ2 , . . . , p* n , the optimal decision for epoch i having observed history H iÀ1 is, for i ¼ 1, . . ., nÀ1, that decision satisfying
The optimal decision d* n for selection in epoch n having observed history H nÀ1 is given by
Equation (1) contains a series of expectations where, apart from the innermost expectation, each is with respect to a distribution of the form P H j jH jÀ1 ,d j (d j is the jth period decision). The conditioning arguments imply that only the result r j remains uncertain, and this can be seen using the equivalent expression E vjH jÀ1 ½P r j jd j ,v .
ADAPTIVE UTILITY
The motives and decision making implications of AU theory were alluded to by Raiffa and Schlaifer [3, pp. 17-19] and the theory itself was formally introduced by Cyert and DeGroot [12] . However, since the work of Cyert and DeGroot, little attention has been paid to AU's development, with the exception of some studies that have tested AU's descriptive validity [13, 14] . (The theory of adaptive utility elicitation [15, 16] is also closely related.) AU theory has been applied in problems of clinical trials, where a doctor may face a trade-off between seeking to enhance understanding of a new medical treatment and the adverse effect that new trials may have upon patient welfare. (Crawford and Shum [13] considered a case of Italian doctors involved in the prescription of pharmaceutical drugs, where the utility-bearing characteristics of the drugs were only revealed through their use.) In this case, AU theory could permit the DM to be uncertain over the consequence that a specific type or level of drug side effect may have upon the patient's utility function. AU theory has also been considered in marketing (demand) theory, where it is useful in the case when a consumer is entering a new market, or when a new brand becomes available for selection. (Erdem and Keane [14] modelled data on liquid detergent purchases within the USA.) In such situations the possibility for receiving utility-bearing information not only will arise as a direct result of experience with the new brand but also could, for example, come from external advertisements that the DM has been exposed to between decision epochs.
One criticism of the classical decision theory previously discussed is that it requires complete and certain knowledge of the DM's utility function for all feasible decision streams and for all possible states of nature. However, it would appear that in many situations it is only natural for the DM to be uncertain over her preferences. For example, it may not be reasonable to expect the DM to be sure over her preferences if she were considering situations in which she had only vague or even no prior experience.
Another common example would be if the DM were considering decisions whose influence would only be felt at a future time and where she is unsure as to how her feelings or situation may then have developed. Moreover, even if the DM has experience with the situation under consideration, it simply may not be feasible to attribute a certain utility to each and every outcome, e.g. on discussing utility elicitation Berger states that a DM requires 'an infinite amount of time and an infinitely accurate mind to obtain a completely accurate specification' [1, p. 69] .
AU differs from classical theory by permitting uncertainty over the utility function and accepting that preferences may not be certain, with expected preferences possibly changing through insight, experience, or information. This can be incorporated through an extra parameter 2 Q, which could be considered to be the DM's 'state of mind'. A particular state of mind would represent a particular preference ranking over the possible outcomes, e.g. one state of mind could be used to represent the preference relation that outcome 1 is preferred to outcome 2, while another may give the reverse preference. States of mind may also be used to give a strength of preference and could, for example, be used to state that one outcome is twice as preferable to another, or that it is ten times as preferable. The utility function is then no longer a function u : F n · V ! R, but rather a function u : F n · V · Q ! R, and the parameter is included within the notation as a conditioning argument for the utility. As an example, with , 0 2 Q i.e. two possible states of mind, the expression A note of warning with reference to the last statement should be made. Classical utility is derived via knowledge of the DM's preferences over gambles over the reward space F n · V. AU simply asserts that such preference relations may themselves be uncertain, and the parameter (together with its associated distribution P ) is used to incorporate this. Formally AU theory considers preferences over gambles over an extended reward space
However, because classical utilities are only unique up to a positive affine transformation, there is a possible problem when a change in scaling affects the comparability of utilities conditioned on different . This situation is avoided by specifying a common scaling over utilities conditioned on various values for (Boutilier [17] discussed one possible method for achieving this under certain assumptions on the preference orderings of rewards for different values of ), and for the remainder of this paper it is assumed that this has been a priori accomplished.
To avoid reduction to classical theory, AU problems occur when the DM is uncertain over . It is assumed that such uncertainty is represented through a prior subjective probability distribution P
. Interesting AU problems are also necessarily sequential, as the theory again coincides with classical theory if only a single decision is required. This can be seen by noting that, if only a single decision is required, the DM should select that decision d 1 from the set of feasible decisions F 1 maximizing the expectation of u(d 1 ,v|) under (in either order; all expectations in this work are assumed finite) distributions P v and P . This expectation is denoted
, the exact same optimal decision would be found as in the classical situation which took u 0 as the DM's utility function.
It is further assumed that in a sequential decision problem the DM may observe information relevant to updating beliefs over as she progresses through decision epochs. Let z i 2 Z denote such information received in epoch i following selection of decision d i . As was performed with regard to updating beliefs over v in the classical theory, a likelihood function is again specified for the probability of observing z 1 , . . ., z m when decisions d 1 , . . ., d m were made and is the true state of mind. For this reason the decision-making history up to and inclusive of epoch m will now be denoted by
The arguments applied in how the updating of v affects future decision selection can equally well be applied for determining the influence that information over has, i.e. the DM should take into account both information already observed and the informativeness of possible decisions when determining optimal strategies. Application of backward induction again permits resolution of optimal decision strategies, and setting
Þ,vjÞ, it can be shown that for i ¼ 1,. . .,nÀ1, given observed history H a iÀ1 , and predetermined optimal strategies p * iþ1 ,p * iþ2 , . . . ,p * n for respective decision epochs iþ1, iþ2,. . .,n, the optimal decision in period i is given by
The optimal decision d * n in period n having observed history H a nÀ1 is given by
Note that the conditioning arguments in distributions of the form P ,d j used in some of the expectations of equation (3) now leave two sources of uncertainty in H a j , i.e. r j and z j . In the case where r j and z j are conditionally independent given d j , this is seen through writing the distribution in the equivalent form of E (3) is effectively saying how the DM should select decisions given the decision history that she has so far observed. The DM must work backwards in decision selection, starting first by considering equation (4) and determining what final decision she should make for each conceivable history H a nÀ1 that she may have observed by that time. Once the DM has determined her decision strategy p* n , she considers how she would make the next but last decision, keeping in mind knowledge of how she will make her final decision. Now equation (3) is used and the DM determines the optimal decision d * nÀ1 for all possible histories H a nÀ2 that she would have observed by this time. This is done by considering what the updated beliefs over v and would be for each possible history H a nÀ2 , and the likelihood of moving to any of the possible histories H a nÀ1 in the following period for each possible decision d nÀ1 . The DM then seeks to pick that decision d* nÀ1 that maximizes the expected utility. This process is considered backward through decisions until the optimal first period decision is selected on the basis of knowledge of how the DM will select decisions in all future periods.
Information z i observed after selection of decision d i that is relevant for updating beliefs over the correct value of can take many different forms, with possibilities ranging from new insight through reflection, to partial observation of correct itself. It of course depends on the particular problem under consideration but, once a source of such information has been identified, and once a likelihood function P z i jd i , has been expressed, the observation of this information can be incorporated into Bayes' theorem for determining posterior distributions over the unknown state .
An important remark to make about the difference between AU and classical decision making is that AU theory is 'forward looking' in both v and (classical theory does not assume uncertainty over utilities and so can only be forward looking in v). This means that, if the receiving of information z i relevant for updating beliefs over depends on the decision selection d i , the DM may find it beneficial to select a decision which, although not appearing optimal under current beliefs over v and , appears more informative with respect to removing the residual uncertainty over these parameters.
To demonstrate this, and hopefully to clarify the motivation and explanation of AU theory before moving on to applications in reliability, consider the following small and hypothetical problem (in which uncertainty over the state of nature v has been removed in order to keep the analysis simple). A DM must at each decision epoch choose between consumption of either an apple or a banana. Letting F n ¼ fA,Bg n with decision A representing selection of the apple and decision B representing selection of the banana, the DM's utility for a sequence of n decisions is specified as uðd 1 , . . . ,d n jÞ ¼ P n i¼1 I fd i ¼Ag þ P n i¼1 I fd i ¼Bg ¼ k þ ðn À kÞ, where I is an indicator function and k is the number of times that decision A is chosen.
This utility function increases utility by 1 for each selection of an apple, while increasing utility by the unknown amount for each selection of the banana (a fruit which is assumed to be unknown to the DM). Here is the DM's true relative weighting of preference between consuming a banana and consuming an apple. However, even though may not be known to the DM, it is assumed that she is able to state prior beliefs P over its value, if for no other reason then that she is permitted to look at the banana, smell the banana, and even discuss the banana with her friends who have eaten one before. What AU theory does not do is force the DM into stating a specific value for that she must then adopt throughout her decision-making analysis, before she has ever had an opportunity to experience eating a banana.
Considering the situation where, after having had the opportunity to examine the banana, the DM specifies 2 Q ¼ {1.5,0.5} with distribution P fully determined by P( ¼ 1.5) ¼ 0.4 (hence E[] ¼ 0.9). If the DM were forced to accept the classical utility specification with having the value 0.9, then, because in this case apples are believed to increase utility more than bananas do, the DM should select d i ¼ A for all i ¼ 1, . . ., n. Hence, because the classical theory does not incorporate AU theory's hypothesis that beliefs over utility specifications can change through trial and insight, the choice of the banana is never selected and the DM never learns whether she truly prefers the apple to the banana.
Instead, using the above distribution for and assuming the experience of consuming a banana fully informs the DM of (and hence preferences between bananas and apples), it can be shown that even in a two-period problem the optimal strategy suggests selection of a banana first (the second decision will depend on whether the DM found this banana to be more or less favourable to the known value of an apple).
The obvious explanation for this is that, if the DM were to act in a forward-looking manner and try the banana at the first decision epoch, she may find herself positively surprised over its value and thus rank it above that for the apple. Such a decision to choose a banana at the first epoch is indeed risky as the DM may find that she did indeed prefer the apple over the banana. However, a potential loss (discovering a dislike for the banana) would be felt at the first epoch only, as the DM could then select the apple in all future decisions, while a potential gain (discovering a preference for the banana) would be felt in all future epochs, as the DM could then continue to select the banana over the apple with the sure knowledge that the banana is indeed preferred.
EXAMPLES IN RELIABILITY
Attention is now turned to demonstrating how AU theory can be of interest to decision problems in the area of reliability. The use of Bayesian statistical decision theory for solving such problems has been applied, for example, in the work by McDaid and Wilson [18] , who considered testing reliability of software systems. However, to permit an uncertain and adaptive utility function is a novel approach which prevents unnecessary restriction to a (possibly incorrect) assumed measure of preferences.
Two examples will be considered in which a system can be unreliable, but where the cost (relative dislike) of system failure is unknown. In both cases the sequential decision problem will consist of three decision epochs, with this duration being selected because it is both short enough to keep results tractable and computation minimal, but also long enough for the effects of AU decision making to be apparent.
Example 1
A newly designed system has associated with it two known failure modes, types A and B, which are assumed to occur independently of each other. First let the time between decision epochs be split into three periods of equal duration (e.g. 3 days or 3 weeks). Assume that in any given period there is the possibility that a failure of type A or B can occur, and both failures of type A and B can occur in the same period. Hence, it is assumed that, at most, two failures can occur in each period (i.e. at most one for each type of failure) and the number of failures per type within a decision epoch will be modelled through a binomial distribution.
The unknown true state of nature will be denoted However, the DM is assumed to be uncertain over how she will feel about the effects of such a cost, and she does not currently know whether she will see such a cost as being severe (S) or mild (M). In both cases the actual cost for a given failure type is known and fixed; it is only the DM's perceived attitude towards this cost that is uncertain. For example, each failure in the system may lead to the loss of a certain number of customers or may lead to a certain financial penalty, but the effect that these situations will have is unknown.
The distribution of failure kinds for a failure of type A or B are modelled by two independent Bernoulli distributions. The DM's unknown true state of mind will be denoted as ¼ ( 
where
This utility function reflects a situation in which the DM prefers low failure rates and low probability that any failure is of kind S. Also note that observed failures over the three epochs do not lead to any direct loss of utility. Such a situation could arise when conducting laboratory tests before launching a new product, where failures in testing are assumed to be negligible, but where failures following market launch would lead to loss (either financial or otherwise) for the company. Equation (5) also penalizes the DM for making decisions to fix failures later in the decision stream (although by later periods more information over unknown parameters may be available). The values of constants involved make this problem non-trivial, i.e. it is not immediately apparent that a specific strategy dominates another. Indeed, once the first decision has been chosen, all future feasible decision streams are optimal for some collection of observations.
Information received between epochs consists of the number of failures that occurred over the three periods in that epoch, their associated type, and also whether these failures were of kind S or M. Such information is clearly relevant for updating beliefs over v and , and the information received in epoch i will be represented by z i ¼ ðz
Here z jk i is the number of failures observed in epoch i that were induced by failure type j and resulted in cost kind k.
This problem can be solved via equation (3), and the relevant results will now be summarized. Table 1 allows the DM to determine the optimal final decision p* 3 given the relevant decision history up to that point. Unfortunately some of the expressions are too long to include and are instead briefly discussed in Appendix 2 (E1 to E12 represent expected utilities and L1 to L12 represent lists of observed histories). Table 2 expresses the optimal second period strategy p * 2 given decision strategy p * 3 , and Table 3 expresses the optimal first period decision p * 1 given decision strategies p * 2 and p * 3 . The conclusion is that the optimal first decision is d * 1 ¼ d B , and further decisions should be selected as indicated by Tables 1 and Table 2 . Decision d B is the optimal first period decision primarily because it is unlikely that both decisions d A and d B will both be included within the decision stream (requires observations with small associated probability) and because under prior beliefs E
As an example of reading these tables, consider the history where no failures are observed in any period. Because the optimal first decision does not depend on observed histories, the DM selects d 1 ¼ d B , and so it is only possible to observe histories in which a failure of type A can occur. Hence in Table 2 Given that no failures were observed before the second epoch, the probability that no failures will be observed after the second epoch is approximately 0.92 (leaving it to be by far the most likely option). Furthermore, the history with no failure of type A observed after the first or the second decision epoch does indeed fall in L2 (see Appendix 2) . Thus for the considered decision history the DM should select decision d N in the final period. Note, however, that Tables 1, 2 , and 3 are created without knowledge of earlier optimal decisions and so include decision histories that become redundant when optimal strategies have been found. For example, the history in L1 which consists of no failures of type B between decision epochs is redundant as it is known that for her first decision the DM should select d B , hence failures of type B will not be permitted. Of course, if for whatever reason the DM did not make decision d B in the first period, then knowledge of the optimal decision given such a decision history would once again prove useful. Also note that, although a potential history of observations can be taken to determine which decision history would be selected, knowledge before the decision problem commences of the failures that will be observed can lead to a different optimal strategy, e.g. by no longer selecting d B in the first period. As a final comment, consider the feature of this example whereby, in certain situations, the observation of system failure can lead to an increase in expected utility. This result arises because the utility function does not include a specific cost for observed failures but rather only takes into account their associated probability and the probability that such failures are of type S. Indeed, although the observation of a system failure will tend to increase the expected value for either v A or v B , if such a failure were of low cost it is 
If history in L7 Maximum expected utility Maximum
If history in L12 . An intriguing note to make on this feature is that it can result in situations, such as the list L9 described above, whereby a failure type is only not rectified provided that the DM observes no failures or observes a certain number of failures of type M (depending on the number of failures of type S also observed). This shows an interesting form of a monotonic relation that would appear in line with intuition. Indeed, the suggestion is certainly true in this example for all the decision histories considered at the end of the first decision epoch, i.e. lists L8, L9, and L12.
Example 2
As a second example of the use of AU theory, consider a situation that is motivated by the hypothesis that individuals commonly tend to overweight the subjective effect or cost of system failure from that which is truly felt.
Consider the scenario where the DM has use of a machine that is in working order 100(1-v) per cent of the time (it is not assumed that deterioration of the machine is possible in this example). The proportion of time that the machine is in working order thus represents the true state of nature and thus v 2 V ¼ [0,1]. At each decision epoch the DM is afforded the opportunity to replace permanently the unreliable machine with one that is known to work perfectly (provided that she has not already done so). The cost of making this exchange at decision epoch i is assumed to be cÀi/2, i.e. the cost of the new machine decreases over time.
The decisions available are represented by D ¼ fd 
The state of mind is to be interpreted as a parameter that alters how the DM views specific reliability levels v. In this case it is assumed that 2 Q ¼ Â Ã and that prior beliefs are represented by the triangular distribution with the probability density function over the range f ðÞ ¼ 8ð2 ÀÞ=9, i.e. under prior beliefs the DM is more likely to overweight the cost of a reliability level v than does the linear rule with ¼ 1.
In order to prevent the example from becoming overly complicated it is assumed that v ¼ 1 2 and c ¼ 2. Hence the only uncertainty remaining is now with respect to the correct state of mind . The DM can learn about this parameter through information z i that is received in epoch i. Noting that, for feasible decision streams, the utility function of equation (6) can be decomposed into the form P 3 i¼1 u 0 ðd i ,vjÞ with
, the DM is able to evaluate an expected value for u 0 (d i ,v|) with respect to the beliefs that she holds over at the beginning of epoch i.
To give the form of information z i it is assumed that, following selection of decision d i , the DM can compare her prior expected value for u 0 (d i ,v|) with the value that it was actually noted to have. However, it is not assumed that the precise difference can be stated, only that the DM can determine which was the greater. That is, the DM can determine whether or not her expectations were too conservative or too optimistic, and this will form categorical data where z i ¼ 1 in the first case and z i ¼ 0 in the latter.
Noting
S can still be selected in a future epoch. The probability of observing z i ¼ 1 given in this case is given by
This problem is again solved via equation (3) and summary results are now discussed. Table 4 determines p* 3 given H a 2 (note that the observation z 2 does not have any effect on this decision). For the second epoch, knowing decision strategy p * 3 , optimal strategy p 2 * can be found through Table 5 . Finally, for the first epoch, knowing decision strategies p * 2 and p * 3 , the optimal first period decision p* 1 is determined through Table 6 .
The optimal decision strategy is thus to stick with the unreliable machine before possibly changing it depending on whether or not the DM's expected utility for sticking was found to be too optimistic or too conservative. Note that, in the classical situation where it is assumed that preferences are characterized by the expectation of under prior beliefs, and where such a preference structure is enforced throughout the problem, the DM would do best to replace the machine immediately. Thus, owing to the extra information that such a decision offers, incorporating the possibility that the DM's current expectations over preferences may be wrong leads to the more conservative decision strategy that selects decision d S in the first epoch.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The current paper has presented decision-making examples within reliability and has commented on how AU theory can be a useful tool for permitting the modelling of uncertain preferences. Future work in this area can take many directions and these are now briefly discussed. AU permits normative decision making without requirement of full knowledge of the DM's utility function. It does, however, presuppose a parametric form for utility. In many cases this may be an equally unreasonable requirement. One alternative is to consider a non-parametric model of utility in which only an expected ordering of preferences is required. Nonparametric statistics [19] are a large area of statistical theory that has been developed to reduce modelling assumptions, and it is of interest to examine whether such techniques can be adapted for use in AU theory.
Moreover, current theory requires the assumption that true utilities are static and do not evolve (only estimations change); however, this also may appear an unreasonable assumption for cases with long planning horizons. Instead it may be possible to permit evolving preferences provided that a probabilistic or deterministic description of the evolution process is stated.
The examples that have been discussed in this paper have been of a basic nature; yet even so, they required many computations for determining optimal decision strategies. It is these computational demands that currently limit the actual applicability of AU theory to real-world problems that may have hundreds of failure modes and a large number of possible states of nature and states of mind. AU permits uncertainty over preferences, but this extra facility over classical Bayesian decision theory leads to a significant increase in the complexity of the analysis. Not only do computational problems arise through the theory's requirement that non-trivial expectations be found (where the solutions may not be available in closed form), but also such terms must be maximized over multi-dimensional spaces. This currently limits the applicability of AU theory, but it is hoped that suitable forms of utility functions can be found that permit relatively simple analysis, e.g. possibly using an analogy to priorlikelihood probability conjugacy [2] . Of course, the modelling of the adaptive utility function should first and foremost be based on actual preferences, and not computationally simple forms. Yet it is of interest to discover whether there are families of adaptive utility forms that may be reasonable in certain situations and which ease the computational burden, similar to the exponential family of distributions in conjugate probability analysis.
Both how states of mind are to be quantified and the meaning of prior beliefs over them are important questions for the development of the theory. Not only do these questions concern elicitation but also, more fundamentally, they are questions regarding the precise philosophical nature of what is called a state of mind in this paper. This is a matter of ongoing research, the results of which are in a thesis by Houlding [20] .
Classical Bayesian decision theory makes use of value of information and risk aversion for interpreting specific problems and specifications, and it would be useful to generalize the classical definitions for both these terms. Any information received over probability parameters need not necessarily have the same value as in classical theory, but it must now also be considered simultaneously with information received over utility parameters. Risk aversion also requires a more Maximum expected utility Maximum 
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Sequential adaptive utility decision making for system failure correctiongeneral definition in AU theory as it should also incorporate a DM's aversion to experiment if utility is uncertain. Further challenges for research into AU theory and its applications include study of coherence properties and consideration of unknown or infinite planning horizons. The calculation of expected utilities (E1 to E12) and the maximization over various decision histories (L1 to L12) that were necessary in example 1 were performed using the mathematical software package Maple. Unfortunately, it is not feasible to include them in full detail within this paper. For example, lists L5, L6, and L7 must between them contain all eight dimensional vectors representing possible observed failure histories by the final period, of which there are 10 4 . The expected utility calculations are also rather messy functions of up to eight variables. Nevertheless, given the problem description, the adaptive utility function and prior beliefs, there is no reason why these calculations cannot be verified by use of equations (3) and (4) . Example 1 is based on an hypothetical scenario and it is hoped that the omission of these calculations do not prevent the reader from appreciating the implications of and possibilities for AU theory. However, as an example of how these calculations are performed and as a demonstration of the general procedure, included below is the derivation of E2 and L2. Examination of the row in Table 1 containing E2 and L2 informs us that these were relevant for if decision d B had previously been made, but not the decision to fix failures of type A.
Thus the current decision is whether or not to fix failure types A permanently and, as beliefs over the number and severity of future failures of type A will not depend on previous observed failures of type B, attention in the decision histories may be restricted to the timing and severity of failures of type A. Hence, because Table 1 represents the decision to be made in the final epoch, entries in L2 will be of the form of a four-dimensional vector ðz Application of Bayes' theorem and use of independences within the problem leads to the result that, for given history H ¼ ðz
